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The Invasion of Iwo Jima
by Dan Riehl
Originally posted to BNN 3/13/2005

Easy Company started with 310 men. We suffered 75% casualties. Only 50 men boarded the ship after the battle. Seven officers went into the battle with me. Only one--me--walked off Iwo."
. . . Captain Dave Severance,
. . . Easy Company Commander (the Flag Raising Company)

Iwo1a(Images clickable for fuller view.)



In English it would be called Sulphur Island, but we know it as Iwo Jima - a five mile wide stretch of barren land that some say represents the defining moment in Marine Corp history. Beginning on February 19, 1945 and for a month, 100,000 Americans and 22,000 Japanese battled for a piece of rock and their respective versions of God and country. When it was over 7,000 good Americans were dead and fewer than 1,000 Japanese had survived. The invasion has been described as "throwing human flesh against reinforced concrete."



Japanese defensive forces were contracted as a result of American successes in the Marshall Islands and both sides knew the value of one small volcanic island seemingly insignificant as compared to the vast reach of the great Pacific. Iwo Jima was the door to the Japanese mainland for American air power – and as much as America wanted the ability to strike at the heart of what it saw as a great evil, the Japanese were intent on not letting it come to pass.



Iwo3The Japanese Army garrison on Iwo Jima originally held over 5,000 men, 13 artillery pieces, 200 light and heavy machine guns, and 4,552 rifles, along with 120mm coast artillery guns, 12 heavy anti-aircraft guns, and 30 25mm dual-mount antiaircraft guns. But that was nothing compared to what would eventually arrive to protect Japan’s hold on the tiny island.



Almost a year earlier Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was told by his emperor that he had been chosen to defend Iwo Jima - at any cost. He was also informed that the eyes of the entire Japanese nation would be focused on the result. The General was determined to mold Iwo into a fortress capable of two things - defending itself; and killing anyone that might dare attack.



During months of preparation all civilians were evacuated and the tiny island began to bulge with Japanese forces. Kuribayashi abandoned doctrine that called for meeting invasion on the beaches and moved his artillery, mortars, and rockets to higher ground.  Japanese engineers designed and built an extensive system of caves and tunnels to lessen the impact of naval bombardment. They also discovered that the island's plentiful volcanic ash made an excellent concrete when mixed with cement.



Reinforcements arrived including the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade of 5,000 men, 2,700 men of the 145th Infantry Regiment, 1,233 members of the 204th Naval Construction Battalion, 2,216 naval personnel, including naval aviators and ground crews. Artillery units and five antitank battalions also arrived.



Iwo5 By the end of 1944 the island held 361 artillery pieces of 75mm or larger caliber, a dozen 320mm mortars, 65 medium (150mm) and light (81mm) mortars, 33 naval guns 80mm or larger, and 94 antiaircraft guns 75mm or larger, more than 200 20mm and 25mm anti-aircraft guns and 69 37mm and 47mm anti-tank guns along with rockets varying from an eight-inch type that weighed 200 pounds and could travel between 2,000-3,000 yards, to a giant 550-pound projectile that had a range of more than 7,500 yards. Altogether, 70 rocket guns and their crews reached Iwo Jima. Twenty-eight tanks assigned to Iwo Jima wound up at the bottom of the sea courtesy of a US submarine but 22 did reach Iwo by year's end. Tanks were deployed in standing positions, buried or with turrets dismounted and emplaced in the rocky ground, basically invisible to the Americans. Iwo Jima became the fortress General Kuribayashi had imagined and he set his final plans –which were a significant departure from previously exhibited strategy.



Japanese artillery would not fire on American naval vessels during pre-landing bombardment. Kuribayashi would all but concede the beaches and let American forces move slightly inland. Automatic weapons fire would open up on American forces when they had gotten approximately 500 yards inland. His artillery would move northward after unleashing hell and death on the American landing forces.



Iwo2_1Three Japanese airstrips were in operation on the island, home to deadly Kamikazes. Taking the airstrips would force the Kamikazes to pull back, complicating operations and the strips could also provide a base of operations for escorts to B29’s America would send over Japan. Strategically, the island could also be used as an emergency facility halfway between Japan and Marianna’s Island.



Admiral Nimitz ordered the seizure of Iwo Jima in October, 1944 - and designated the men to do it. General Holland Smith was to oversee the operation with Admiral Spruance, Commander, Fifth Fleet, in charge as Operation Commander, Task Force 50. The Joint Expeditionary Force, Task Force 51 would be commanded by Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific, with Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill as second in command. General Holland Smith was designated Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56. The teams experience came from places with now familiar names like Guadalcanal, Guam, the Solomon’s, Tarawa, and the mountainous Mariana’s.



The 3rd Marines were reorganizing on Guam and along with the heavy fighting they'd seen there, had already recently been through Bougainville in the Solomon’s; that didn't prevent their being tasked to begin planning for Iwo along with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The 4th and 5th Marines, without the 26th Marines to be held in reserve, were tasked with the beach assault. The 3rd Marines were also to be held in reserve; the plan calling for them to go in on D plus three.



The following extended edited quote from here

The VAC scheme of maneuver for the landings was relatively simple. The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were to land abreast on the eastern beaches, the 4th on the right and the 5th on the left. When released to VAC, the 3d Marine Division, as Expeditionary Troops Reserve, was to land over the same beaches to take part in the attack or play a defensive role, whichever was called for. The plan called for a rapid exploitation of the beachhead with an advance in a northeasterly direction to capture the entire island. A regiment of the 5th Marine Division was designated to capture Mount Suribachi in the south.
...



The eastern beaches over which the landings were to be made extended for about 3,500 yards northeastward from Mount Suribachi to the East Boat Basin. For purposes of organization and control of the invasion force, these beaches were divided into seven 500-yard segments, which, from left to right, were designated as Green, Red 1 and 2, Yellow 1 and 2, and Blue 1 and 2. The 5th Marine Division, landing over Green, Red 1, and Red 2 beaches, was to advance straight across the island, which at this point formed a narrow isthmus, until it reached the west coast. At the same time, it was to hold along the right, while part of the division wheeled to the south to capture Mount Suribachi. The 4th Marine Division had the specific mission of moving into the center of the isthmus, while its right flank swerved to the north to seize Motoyama Plateau, the high ground above the East Boat Basin. Unless this vital ground to the north of the invasion beaches and Mount Suribachi to the south - terrain features which overlooked the beaches and permitted the enemy to fire at the exposed Marines at will - were quickly seized, the landing force could be expected to take very heavy casualties.



Iwo6 Once the southern portion of Iwo Jima had been secured, the two divisions could join in a combined drive to the north. At this time, the 3d Marine Division, initially in Expeditionary Troop Reserve on board ships near the beachhead, could be disembarked and landed to assist in maintaining the momentum of the VAC attack.



The detailed scheme of maneuver for the landings provided for the 28th Marines of the 5th Marine Division, commanded by Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, to land on the extreme left of the corps on Green 1. On the right of the 28th Marines, the 27th, under Colonel Thomas A. Wornham, was to attack towards the west coast of the island, then wheel northeastward and seize the O-1 Line. Action by the 27th and 28th Marines was designed to drive the enemy from the commanding heights along the southern portion of Iwo, simultaneously securing the flanks and rear of VAC. As far as the 4th Marine Division was concerned, the 23d Marines, commanded by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, was to go ashore on Yellow 1 and 2 beaches, seize Motoyama Airfield No. 1, then turn to the northeast and seize that part of Motoyama Airfield No. 2 and the O-1 Line within its zone of action. After landing on Blue Beach 1, the 25th Marines, under Colonel John R. Lanigan, was to assist in the capture of Airfield No. 1, the capture of Blue Beach 2, and the O-1 Line within its zone of action.25 The 24th Marines, under Colonel Walter I. Jordan, was to be held in 4th Marine Division reserve during the initial landings. The 26th Marines , led by Colonel Chester B. Graham, was to be released from corps reserve on D-Day and prepared to support the 5th Marine Division.



Division artillery was to go ashore on order from the respective division commanders. The 4th Marine Division was to be supported by the 14th Marines, commanded by Colonel Louis G. DeHaven; Colonel James D. Wailer's 13th Marines was to furnish similar support for the 5th Marine Division.



The operation was to be so timed that at H-Hour 68 LVT (A) 4s, comprising the first wave, were to hit the beach. These vehicles were to advance inland until they reached the first terrace beyond the high-water mark. The armored amphibians would use their 75mm howitzers and machine guns to the utmost in an attempt to keep the enemy down, thus giving some measure of protection to succeeding waves of Marines who were most vulnerable to enemy fire at the time they debarked from their LVTs. Though early versions of the VAC operations plan had called for tanks of the 4th and 5th Tank Battalions to be landed at H plus 30, subsequent studies of the beaches made it necessary to adopt a more flexible schedule. The possibility of congestion at the water's edge also contributed to this change in plans. In the end, the time for bringing the tanks ashore was left to the discretion of the regimental commanders. Company A of the 5th Tank Battalion attached to the 27th Marines was scheduled to land on the Red Beaches at the prearranged time of H plus 30 minutes.26



In the event that the landings took place on the western beaches of Iwo, the alternate plan made provision for a company of the 24th Marines, reinforced by a platoon of armored amphibians from the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, to seize Kangoku Rock, a 600-yard-long island lying about 2,200 feet northwest of Iwo Jima. The island could be used as an artillery site and for this reason a contingency plan was prepared to land the 105mm howitzers of 4/14 there.



... On February 16, 1945, they commenced a massive three-day air and naval bombardment of the island.

Iwo4 After 10 weeks of aerial bombardment the US Marines landed on Iwo Jima at 8:59 on February 19, 1945. There were 70,000 available for the invasion against estimates of from 22,000 – 27,000 Japanese.



The Japanese employed about 800 pillboxes and over 3 miles of tunnels in a defense in depth strategy to propel the invasion. Marines struggled with 100-pound backs while slogging through the island’s volcanic ash and the steep slope of the assault ground made return fire next to impossible during the initial attack. At 9:15 Japanese mortars started to rain down on the Marines. The Japanese had placed anti-tank mines on the slopes and they were effective against the Marines LVT's (Landing Vehicles Tracked). On the southern end of the island Mount Suribachi allowed the Japanese to fire on virtually any Marine position they chose - it was the Marines first objective.



Support troops, including the well-known Seabees took the brunt of causalities on the first day of the invasion. At days end the Marines had landed over 30,000 men, Suribachi was isolated and part of Airfield 1 was captured, still the Marines had not realized half of their original objectives for the initial assault.



The Marines set out south to Suribachi on February 20th, while also branching out north to the airfields. The notorious Banzai attack style of the Japanese in other battles took a great toll on US forces, but it also forced a fairly quick resolution to a battle. There were no such attacks on Iwo, which promised to make it a drawn out but no less bloody affair. Marines were forced to burn out their heavily entrenched enemy with flamethrowers, gasoline and satchel charges. Marine pilots flew close air support just hundreds of yards in front of advancing troops while cruisers and destroyers provided close bombardment.



Iwo7 February 21 and 22 saw more intense fighting and the Japanese began Kamikaze attacks against US invasion ships sinking the carrier Bismark and damaging the Saratoga. On land, advance could be measured in feet, yards and deaths  and action took on the look of a full frontal assault comparable to the trench warfare of World War 1. Many Navy nurses, nick-named “Angels in the Air” braved the battle by landing on Iwo under fire to treat and evacuate wounded Marines.



On February 23 units of the Marines reached the top of Suribachi and a patrol led by Lt. Harold Schreir raised a small flag on top of Mt. Suribachi. at 10:20 A.M. The now famous photograph of Joe Rosenthal was taken later when a larger flag was brought in from an LST (Landing Ship Tank). Elsewhere, Marines had advanced north to the second airfield.



The 4th and 5th Marines, led by tanks, pressed the attack with help from naval and air bombardment through February 24 - 25. Japanese mines and anti-tank guns took a significant toll on the US tanks. At day's end the 5th had gained only 500 yards and the 3rd Marine Division was called upon to continue the attack. They began the second day at 9:30 AM but could only go slowly, flame throwers and satchel charges going before them to burn out the stubborn and entrenched Japanese forces.



Progress began to be made over the next three days. High ground overlooking airfield 3 was occupied but many surrounding hills remained in Japanese hands. The hills had numbers, 382 and 362A, others were given names by the advancing Marines - Turkey Knob, Meat Grinder and the Amphitheater, to name a few. Hollowed out until they became fortresses themselves, the hills also held pillboxes, antitank guns and concealed artillery. By March 1st the Marines had taken hill 382 in some of the most intense fighting of the battle and were moving on 362A.



On March 2nd the Marines employed a surprise night assault 362A; but even with the element of surprise the fortified positions were not captured for six days on March 8th. The Japanese continued fighting from fierce pockets of resistance even though the Marines occupied many strategic points and the first damaged B29 had managed to land on Iwo Jima on March 4th. P-51's began arriving to provide more air support to the Marines on the island by March 6th, which relieved Task Force 58 - but only so they could begin preparations for Okinawa on 4/1: some relief. And the Japanese had finally decided to counter-attack.



Iwo8 On March 8th the Japanese launched a counter attack between the 23rd and 24th Marine regiments. Lacking artillery support and caught in the open by Marine artillery, the attacked was thwarted and the Japanese lost 650 men.



Small pocket Japanese resistance continued for the next few weeks with infiltrating attacks disrupting communications and going after what command posts and headquarters they could locate. On March 25th the last pocket of Japanese resistance was secured at Kitano Point. Over 200 Japanese infiltrated US lines that night and some reports suggest that the attack was led by Japanese Commander General Kurbayashi himself. No matter - in the morning over 250 Japanese soldiers lay dead and scattered about the US Marine lines. The island was declared secure on March 26th and less than two weeks later 100 P51's were stationed on the island and flying escort for B29's on raids over the Japanese mainland.
The United States lost 6,821 men with another 19,217 wounded and 2,648 suffering from combat fatigue for a total of 28,686.  Marine causalities were listed at 23,573, roughly 82% of the total. The Marines took 1,083 Japanese troops prisoner and killed 20,000, according to estimates. It was an expensive 8 square miles of land for both sides, to say the least.



Iwo9 Some Final Notes



More US Marines earned the Medal of Honor on Iwo Jima than in any other battle in US History. The Marines had requested 13 days of pre-landing bombardment but were denied this request because of commitments to Macarthur’s campaign in Luzon. The 3 days of bombardment provided were insufficient. Estimates of Japanese strength on the island were low by as much as 70%. The altered tactics of the Japanese were not anticipated, nor was the impact of the volcanic soil of Iwo Jima on advancing Marines. The US had underestimated its causalities by as much as 80%. Ultimately the Marines took 23,000 causalities out of 70,000 - over a third of participating Marines. The invasion succeeded but also served as a potent warning of what awaited at Okinawa.



Source links and additional information, reading and history available here, here, here, here, and here. This post also available through the Blogger News Network.



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Dan Riehl blogs at Riehl World View.

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